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Welche	 Europarepräsentationen	 dienten	 den	 Kriegsbefürwortern	 als	 Legitimationsressource,	
wie	 instrumentalisierten	Kritiker	Europabilder,	um	für	 ihre	politischen	Positionen	zu	werben?	







In political terms, the European expansion in the age of empires was the work of single 
nation states – European imperialism was “merely the sum of individual imperialisms.”1 
Conversely, research on the history of European self-conceptions from a cultural and 
intellectual history perspective has been able to demonstrate that imperial and colonial 
contexts were crucial to European representations of the Self and the Other, and that the 
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imperialist expansion in extra-European world regions was also conceived of and legiti-
mized as a European project.2 Proceeding from this line of inquiry, this article seeks to 
examine how the concept of European imperialism influenced political communication 
in two nation states, namely Great Britain and Germany. Even though the politicians 
responsible reached decisions about imperial and colonial matters within a national (or 
international) context, they regularly used representations of the European and the non-
European as a resource to justify their actions in public.
What follows is an analysis of the legitimizing function of representations of Europe 
in the debates surrounding colonial wars and imperialist interventions. It focuses on 
those military actions which, through the use or the threat of military force, ultimately 
made imperial rule possible.3 The legitimacy of these military efforts was a commonly 
contested issue in public debates around 1900. Representations of Europe could have a 
variety of functions in these debates about legitimacy, the main types of which shall be 
enumerated below. In political practice, however, there were always several interwoven 
patterns of argumentation at play – whenever politicians justified, criticised or demand-
ed a particular decision, consistency in content was not their main concern, as they re-
sorted to any argument that supported their own position. The convolution of different 
patterns of argumentation will then be addressed in the second part of this essay, which 
will examine public debates on a number of British and German colonial wars as well 
as imperialist interventions in the period before and after the turn of the century. The 
central question is: To what extent did politicians and the pro-colonial press legitimize 
military actions with the purported aim of transforming non-European regions accord-
ing to the European model? In this context, both politicians and the press often used 
“Europe” as a term that was interchangeable with other concepts such as “civilisation” 
or “culture”, and “Europeans” were synonymous with “whites”.4 In order to adequately 
2	 Cf.	H.	 Gollwitzer,	 Europabild	 und	 Europagedanke.	 Beiträge	 zur	 deutschen	 Geistesgeschichte	 des	 8.	und	 9.	
Jahrhunderts,	2.	ed.,	München	964,	28-2;	U.	Frevert,	Eurovisionen.	Ansichten	guter	Europäer	im	9.	und	20.	
Jahrhundert,	Frankfurt	am	Main	200,	78-00;	H.	Kaelble,	Eine	europäische	Geschichte	der	Repräsentationen	


















44 | Christian Methfessel
analyse representations of Europe, this investigation will thus not merely confine itself 
to sources making specific mention of “Europe”, but also include those employing terms 
closely related to Europe.
1.  Representations of Europe: Function and Form in Debates about  
Imperial Expansion
At the beginning of colonial wars and imperialist interventions, a clearly formulated 
imperial programme was usually not at the centre of the media’s attention, which ini-
tially focused on reports of endangered fellow countrymen.5 Politicians and the press 
subsequently legitimized the ensuing military actions with the protection of compatriots 
in danger. The distinction between the European and the non-European played a signifi-
cant role in this process; it was, after all, the threat emanating from what was perceived 
to be a “barbaric” enemy which made military intervention seem necessary. Hence there 
was often talk of “Europeans” or “whites” under threat, even in instances where only the 
members of a single nation were in danger. Uprisings in the colonies regularly began 
with such reports, but also when fellow nationals were under threat in seemingly uncivi-
lized or semi-civilized states, the imperial powers made military action their prerogative.6 
Military interventions for the protection of Europeans in distress tended to find approval 
even among critics of colonial policy, which made it easier for governments to commence 
with the mobilization of troops and press ahead with imperial expansion.
Following the eruption of conflicts, however, the debates about their causes and the 
political aims of the military actions also ensued. The question arose whether current 
colonial policy and the conduct of those on the spot were to blame for the escalation, 
and whether further imperial expansion or a withdrawal from the area in question was 
the more desirable course of action.
Advocates of imperial expansion often legitimized colonial wars and imperialist interven-
tions with the commitment to the “civilizing mission”7 or the “cultural obligation” of the 
“more highly developed states”. The civilizing mission in this case can be understood as 
the aspiration to spreading the European model throughout the extra-European world.8 
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rope and the non-European was conceived of in hierarchical terms and belief in the su-
periority of European civilization dominated public discourse,9 it was not to be expected 
– at least not in the foreseeable future – that the extra-European regions of the world 
could be placed on an equal footing with Europe by means of an orientation towards the 
European model (barring the United States and Japan). Indeed, colonial rule and waging 
wars to maintain it were also legitimized by arguing that it served to raise the “civiliza-
tional standards” of the colonized peoples. In the eyes of the colonial rulers, however, 
this elevation could only be a gradual one – the hierarchy between the European colonial 
masters and their colonial subjects was to remain in place.
The primary objective was the suppression of customs that were perceived to be uncivi-
lized and running counter to European values. Widespread colonial stereotypes about 
cannibalism, slave-trade and human sacrifices in Africa were regularly employed as a 
means to justify imperial expansion.10 Furthermore, colonial rule was also meant to serve 
the spreading of Christianity, at least in the eyes of some of its supporters.11 According 
to the usual line of argumentation, Christianity was not to be spread directly by military 
means; however the creation of a secure environment was supposed to allow the mis-
sionaries to peacefully promote their faith.
Expanding the outreach of European civilization seemed desirable to many at the time, 
even within the milieu of the German Social Democrats, otherwise fierce opponents of 
imperialism.12 Nevertheless, colonial critics such as the Social Democrats argued that 
military means were ill-suited for this purpose – even counterproductive – and called for 
civilization to be spread by peaceful means. And whenever it was possible to point out 
past transgressions of the colonial administration which could not be reconciled with 
the idea of the civilizing mission, anti-war critics would invoke them to delegitimize the 
military effort.
Colonial policy and warfare served to enforce the creation of economic structures that 
were in tune with European conceptions and wishes. Coercive measures such as the im-
position of taxes were often employed in an effort to raise the “working morale” among 
the colonial subjects or establish one in the first place. In pro-colonial circles, such aims 
were considered to be part and parcel of the civilizing mission. Supporters of colonial 
policy for instance claimed that economic reforms would also help improve the standard 
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of living of the colonized population and contribute to their “civilization”, and the intro-
duction of “legitimate trade” – as an alternative to slavery – in particular was considered 
to be the essential feature of this “civilization” and a contribution to the overall progress 
of humanity at large. Thus when it came to legitimizing the war, economic motives and 
humanitarian rhetoric went hand in hand. However, there were also cases where the 
pro-war press openly argued that spreading the European economic model in the extra-
European world should, above all, serve European interests. This was particularly appar-
ent in cases where some of the war’s proponents openly argued in social-Darwinist terms 
and would not even claim that colonial rule also served the interests of the colonized 
population. Rather, they invoked the right of the stronger and called for the suppression, 
displacement or even eradication of the non-European population. Arguments of this 
kind commonly surfaced whenever the debate concerned wars in settler colonies.13
However, the economic viability of single colonies and the benefits of colonialism as such 
were far from beyond dispute, and the burden which its costs placed on the taxpayer 
was among the most commonly raised arguments by opponents of military interven-
tion. Critics would resort to representations of the European and the non-European to 
delegitimize colonial wars and imperialist interventions when they depicted the regions 
in question as unattractive and full of difficulties and dangers for the European military. 
Such depictions often drew on imageries of un-European landscapes14 and were meant 
to make expansion into these regions seem undesirable.
Representations of internal European divisions gained currency whenever colonial wars 
were said to be based on strategic interests. In some cases, ruling over a particular area 
was less decisive than ensuring they would not be ruled by others. This raises the ques-
tion of how the depiction of other states could influence public debates. This would 
not merely involve rivalries, but also the possible desirability of co-operation with other 
states in the name of imperial expansion as a common European project. These portray-
als also dealt with the question of the extent to which these other nations were worthy 
representatives and spreaders of European civilization. If the actions of a particular state 
did not appear to meet the demands of civilization, co-operation was less desirable; states 
were occasionally even characterized as un-European as a means of emphasizing conflicts 
and rivalries.
Representations of “Europe” and “civilization” not only shaped the debates around the 
necessity and purpose of military actions but also the acceptability of particular forms 
of warfare. According to a widespread notion, other forms of warfare that differed from 
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fighting non-European adversaries.15 Critical voices on the other hand called for Europe-
an values to be upheld even towards “barbarian” adversaries, which for instance included 
the demand for prisoners or the wounded to be kept alive.
2.  Legitimization of Imperial Military Interventions in Great Britain and  
Germany before and after 1900
After having traced the typical patterns of argumentation during the period under exam-
ination, their employment in the press and parliamentary debates will now be analysed 
through individual case studies. These will be confined to British and German military 
actions from the mid-1890s into the first decade of the twentieth century. Both coun-
tries experienced an intensification of imperial expansion during this period. Numerous 
military actions were to maintain, expand or intensify their rule over the extra-European 
regions of the world. As will be shown, however, the assessment of the desirability and 
necessity of military force in the non-European world changed along with the ways in 
which both supporters and critics of military action employed representations of Europe 
to make their case.
Great Britain was under the impression of a spirit of imperialistic optimism in the late 
1890s. This period in British history has often been portrayed as the high-point of “jin-
goism”, that particular blend of aggressive nationalism and imperialism which found its 
expression in popular culture. On the political level, the Unionist government elected 
in 1895 embodied the new course, personified by the new Colonial Minister Joseph 
Chamberlain. The numerous colonial wars of this period were popular events; the no-
tion that the military advancement of imperial expansion would be a desirable course of 
action was widespread. An editorial published in the Daily Mail provided the following 
outlook for the coming year 1897: “There will be fighting in the New Year, of course, for 
the reconquest of the Sudan awaits us […]. But a little blood-letting is good for a nation 
that tends to excess of luxury.”16
The abovementioned war in the Sudan (1896–1899) like few others was legitimized by 
its supporters as a crusade to spread civilization, considering that the adversaries were 
deemed to be “fanatics” and the regime in the Sudan represented the despotic counter-
image of European civilization. Following the public announcement of Anglo-Egyptian 
military operations, Arthur Balfour addressed the House of Commons to defend this 
course of action on the government’s behalf, arguing it would be “a gain to civilization 
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the planned conquest of the Sudan to be “to the profit of Egypt, of England, and of all 
civilization.”18
However, the war involved actions that were deemed a violation of the values of civi-
lization by parts of the British public. Aside from the killing of enemy wounded, the 
desecration of the mortal remains of the Mahdi, the Empire’s arch enemy in the Sudan 
in the 1880s, and the destruction of his tomb caused particular offence and raised seri-
ous concerns.19 To illustrate this controversy, one may consider the press coverage of a 
parliamentary debate in June 1899 which discussed awarding the sum of 30,000 pounds 
to the military commander Lord Kitchener in honour of his achievements in the Sudan. 
The issue of the mistreatment of the Mahdi’s remains was also raised, upon which Arthur 
Balfour explicitly defended Kitchener on the government’s behalf. The jingoist Daily 
Mail deemed Balfour’s speech to be so compelling that any reasonable person would 
have to recognize that Kitchener’s course of action was “wise policy”. Indeed, “repulsive 
to all ideas of our present civilization,”20 but necessary nonetheless, for otherwise the 
burial site of the Mahdi would have become the focus of future rebellions. The Times, 
which tended to feature a pro-imperialist and pro-government outlook, also justified the 
grant, though it argued more cautiously that the destruction of the tomb – whether right 
or wrong – was “high policy” in any case and stood in no relation to Kitchener’s merits 
anyhow. It welcomed the grant from the outset, in light of his “services to the Empire 
and to civilization.”21
Both the radical Reynolds’s Newspaper and the left-liberal Manchester Guardian were 
of a different view. While each honoured Kitchener’s military achievements despite hav-
ing opposed the campaign, they wanted the assessment of the tomb’s destruction and 
the desecration of the Mahdi to be weighted differently. The Manchester Guardian for 
instance stressed the basic principle that wars against “savages” would have to be fought 
like wars against civilized adversaries, and noted critically the differing perspective of 
Kitchener’s supporters in parliament: “Because he was a Soudanese fanatic it is assumed 
that we may treat his tomb as if we too were Soudanese fanatics.”22
On the whole however, opponents of the war argued from a defensive position, while its 
proponents confidently presented the argument that this was a war being waged in the 
name of civilization. Strategic arguments also played a role, and the pro-colonial press 
repeatedly pointed out that spreading civilization in the Sudan would simultaneously 
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withstanding, legitimizations of the war mainly focused on the overthrow of “tyranny” or 
“despotism” in the Sudan and the establishment of a “civilized” government.23
This also applies to a number of other wars involving the British Empire during this pe-
riod, such as the expedition to Benin in 1897 or the colonial war in Sierra Leone in 1898. 
In both cases it was initially a matter of protecting Europeans or retribution for killed 
compatriots which played no small part in making the subsequent military reaction 
appear justified. The expedition to Benin was preceded by a massacre on an unarmed 
legation that had embarked to meet the ruler of Benin for negotiations. Following the 
first reports of this incident, the Daily Mail demanded revenge, calling for it to be served 
“coolly, but promptly, and with such severity that these savages shall never dare lay finger 
on an Englishman again.”24 The colonial war in Sierra Leone began in a similar fashion, 
with reports of murdered merchants and missionaries.
In the case of Benin, however, additional older reports detailing the culture of cruelty 
at the court of the King of Benin and the human sacrifices there lent legitimacy to the 
actions that were taken against this African ruler.25 When it came to the war in Sierra 
Leone, sceptical voices criticized that the misguided policy of introducing the hut tax was 
responsible for the uprising. Conversely, supporters of colonial policy in Sierra Leone 
argued that this revolt had been the inevitable outcome of civilization, law and order 
making inroads into “barbarian” areas. As the further advancement of civilization re-
mained an imperative, however, they called for an intensification of colonial rule in the 
hinterland – a policy that eventually became prevalent.26
The prominent role of the civilizational argument in the British wars before the turn 
of the century can in part be explained by the fact that these wars were an overall suc-
cess when viewed from the British Empire’s perspective. Furthermore, they took place 
at a point in time when imperial expansion and the military actions associated with it 
enjoyed a considerable degree of popularity among the British public. The Boer War 
(1899–1902) marked both the high point and turning point of this popularity. Prior to 
its outbreak, the Daily Mail commenced to beat the drums of war with particular vigour, 
portraying a war between the British Empire, as a representative of civilization, and the 
Boer republics, which were described as uncivilized, as increasingly unavoidable in order 
to introduce the rules of civilization across South Africa. Wartime propaganda centred 
on the disadvantaged position of the British (and other foreigners) in the Boer republics 
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this kind played no small part in the British media’s depiction of the Boers as uncivilized 
(though European) and perceptions of the war’s legitimacy. Yet the war became increas-
ingly less popular as the military effort wore on and grew ever more costly and thus 
contributed to an overall decline in the degree of approval for imperial expansion.28
Germany too was in the midst of a new phase of imperial expansion during this period. 
Both past commentators and current research view the late 1890s as the beginning of 
the new “Weltpolitik” (world politics). Voices demanding a more active policy “over-
seas” began to multiply from 1895 onwards;29 in 1896 Kaiser Wilhelm II announced 
his empire’s new claim to becoming a world power;30 in 1897 the new agenda eventu-
ated a change in personnel when Bernhard von Bülow was appointed Foreign Secretary 
and Alfred von Tirpitz became Secretary of State of the German Imperial Naval Office. 
While the early beginnings of “Weltpolitik” certainly struck a chord among parts of the 
public, they neither aroused overwhelming enthusiasm nor unanimous exaltation. This 
had less to do with the concrete, rather small-scale military actions with a successful 
outcome in the second half of the 1890s than with the costly build-up of the naval fleet. 
Long and tedious negotiations were necessary before the government could finally drum 
up a majority in the Reichstag and pass the First Navy Bill in 1898, and the National 
Liberals, the only party to offensively campaign on the back of its support for Weltpo-
litik sustained an electoral defeat in the 1898 Reichstag elections.31 Nevertheless, the 
government was able to secure the support of both the majority of the Reichstag and the 
press for the German Reich’s military interventions in Haiti and China in 1897. It was 
of particular significance that the government deployed gunships for the protection of 
fellow countrymen in both cases and simultaneously seized upon these interventions to 
underscore its own claim to becoming a world power with national pathos. Following 
the intervention in China, which was sparked off by the killings of two missionaries, the 
territory that came to be known as the colony of “Kiao-chau” was annexed in 1898. The 
German government was able to act as the protector of the missionaries, which ensured 
the approval of the Catholic Centre Party, while the hopes invested in the future of the 
Chinese market allowed it to mobilize supporters from various political camps, even 
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When the Boxer War began in summer 1900 and Beijing’s diplomatic quarter came 
under siege, politicians and the media in England and Germany justified their military 
actions as a “punitive crusade in the name of civilization”.33 Rescuing Europeans in dan-
ger and taking revenge for murdered Europeans stood at the centre of the war’s legitimi-
zation. Beyond this, the military actions of the imperialist states were meant to ensure 
that China’s future development would also proceed according to European designs. 
Writing in the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, the German novelist Dagobert von Gerhardt-
Amyntor stipulated that the “bloody seeds” of the uprising would bear the “harvest” of 
an advanced stage in development, “not only for the civilized nations, but also for the 
yellow men themselves.”34
Faced with a common enemy, English and German newspapers called for co-operation 
between the states which were actively engaged on Chinese soil, and appeals of this kind 
were often addressed to “Europe”35 whenever the press demanded unity among the ene-
mies of China – even though the military coalition included not only six European states 
but also Japan and the United States. At the same time, calls for European co-operation 
were often coupled with criticism of individual states. English media pundits tended to 
be particularly adamant in their criticism of the traditional rival Russia, and occasionally 
went as far as to call for its exclusion from the European community. According to one 
racist pattern of argumentation that came to be employed in this context, the Russian 
Tsars had Mongolian blood pumping through their veins and therefore did not belong 
to Europe but stood in closer relation to the Chinese race instead.36 
Generally speaking, the necessity of the war against China was rarely in dispute. Indeed, 
as in the previously mentioned controversies surrounding the British campaign in the 
Sudan, reports of lootings and massacres led critics to question whether the conduct 
of European troops did justice to the demands of their own civilization. Essentially, 
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case, the costly deployment of a large contingent of troops was among the main reasons 
for the dwindling popularity of the military effort. Although the German government 
initially enjoyed considerable support for its war strategy, the German troops did not 
arrive in China until after the high point of the war and the siege of Beijing was already 
over. Hence the deployment of large numbers of soldiers aroused little excitement and 
the “China mood” (“Chinastimmung”) subsided.37
Thus attitudes towards colonial wars and imperialist interventions in Great Britain and 
Germany became subject to change around the turn of the century. Military interven-
tions in the non-European world grew increasingly unpopular – one may even speak of 
an intermittent crisis of colonial and imperial policy in both states. In Great Britain’s 
case, the Boer War from 1899 to 1902 led to uncertainties with regard to its imperial 
self-image. Particularly the “War Stories Scandal” over corruption during the war tar-
nished the reputation of the Unionist government.38
Debates surrounding other imperial issues also came to undermine the government’s 
popularity: The employment of Chinese contract labourers in South Africa caused pub-
lic outrage in England and led to a long-lasting debate that contributed to the Unionist 
government’s subsequent electoral defeat. This also holds true for the actions of Cham-
berlain, who publicly campaigned for an imperial policy of protectionism. Protective 
tariffs were unpopular in England, and the differences in opinion on this imperial issue 
within the Conservative Party weakened it further.39 Against this backdrop, it was a 
widespread notion within government circles that the public could not be expected to 
overwhelmingly approve of additional colonial wars.40 When it came to military actions 
in the extra-European world nonetheless, government officials and the pro-colonial press 
tended to argue from a much more defensive position in their justifications than before 
1900. As for the Liberal government, which came to replace the Unionist cabinet in 
1905, imperial events and developments may not have contributed to a kind of per-
manent crisis as it had been experienced by their predecessors, however it too sought to 
avoid military actions outside of Europe or keep them contained – an aggressive form of 
imperialism remained unpopular.
Henceforth the argument of the civilizing mission lost its former pull when it came to 
British colonial wars. During the expeditions in Somalia from 1901 to 1904 against an 
enemy referred to as the “Mullah”, this kind of argumentation did not even feature in 
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the Sudan. Strategic considerations (i.e. the proximity to Aden) were at the forefront of 
the military action, and those defending this unpopular expedition in public placed par-
ticular emphasis on the promise of protecting allied tribes. Even the pro-colonial press 
did not call for an expansion into inner Somalia to spread “European civilization” there. 
While the Daily Mail demanded reinforcements as a reaction to a defeat in Somalia in 
October 1902, it also came to describe Somalia as “one of the least desirable countries on 
the face of the earth.”41 Opponents of the military effort seized upon this representation 
of Somalia as an unattractive region for European to call for a termination of the expe-
ditions. Even the Conservative Prime Minister Arthur Balfour served to reinforce these 
representations when he declared in a speech in November 1902: “Waterless wastes and 
nomad fanatics have always been difficult problems to deal with since the very dawn of 
civilized communities.” At the same time, he described the intervention as less impor-




While the war against Tibet in 1903/443 was also meant to force the Tibetans into up-
holding a trade agreement signed in 1890 and thereby incorporate Tibet into the global 
world economy under European domination, this argument was never the decisive one 
for its proponents – it proved itself ineffective and even met with public ridicule. A 
cartoon appearing in Punch depicted Britain as a lion, proclaiming “I’ve come to bring 
you the blessings of Free Trade,” upon which Tibet, represented by a llama, replies: “I’m 
a protectionist. Don’t want ‘em.”44 Punch effectively equated Tibet’s position with the 
political position of Chamberlain; hence Tibet’s refusal to embrace free trade hardly 
appeared as a legitimate reason for war. Indeed, this satirical equation should not be 
overrated, however even in the political debate opponents of the war came to describe 
the Tibetans as a people who had a right to be left in peace. The government and the pro-
war press thus placed less emphasis on spreading free trade and highlighted the threat 
emanating from Russian activities in Tibet to make the case for war. A commentary 
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Once again, Russia appeared as a partly Asian power. This time however it was not the 
Tsar’s family which came to embody this Asian element: Dorzhiev, a man from Central 
Asia who was active in Tibet and considered a Russian spy was cast in this role, although 
his significance was extremely overrated by both the English political establishment and 
the public. While the actual insignificance of Russian activities was revealed upon the 
conclusion of the Tibet War, the expedition’s success served to legitimize the British 
course of action.46 Nevertheless, supporters of the action were cautious in their argu-
mentation when it came to the question of further expanding the outreach of European 
civilization – the Times for instance wrote that it was up to the Tibetan rulers to decide 
whether Tibet opened itself up to European tourists.47
The fact that, unlike British military actions before 1900, exporting the European model 
by force played no role in either of these two wars certainly also had something to do 
with their particular political and geographical contexts. Indeed, during the war against 
the Sultanate of Sokoto, which ended in 1903 and was more comparable to the wars 
before 1900, the Times justified the intervention with the spreading of civilization and 
the overthrow of a ruler whom it described as a tyrant. At the same time, however, it 
pointed out that this war had barely cost anything and that a direct form of British rule 
in this region had not been planned.48 The Times thus pursued a more cautious line of 
argumentation than in previous pledges for imperial expansion and an intensification of 
colonial rule in the name of the civilizing mission before 1900.
This defensive stance of British imperial policy in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury also manifested itself in the public portrayal of British and Russian interventions in 
the Persian Civil War in 1909. Moreover, the Tsarist Empire no longer appeared as the 
rival of the British Empire as it had been the case during the wars in China and Tibet. 
Two years earlier, both states had negotiated a settlement concerning imperial points 
of contention in Asia. Great Britain, which had previously sympathised with the re-
form-oriented opposition, and Russia, whose traditional policy had been to support the 
reactionary Shah, agreed upon a common course of action.49 This co-operation was by 
no means beyond dispute; there were critics in Great Britain who alleged that the govern-
ment was merely supporting Russian ambitions by co-operating with the Tsarist Empire, 
keeping the Shah in office as a puppet and suppressing the opposition. The Times on the 
other hand did its utmost to back the pro-Russian course of Foreign Secretary Edward 
Grey. The fact that Russia was actually beginning to reconsider its previous support for 
the Shah at the time – albeit hesitantly – worked out in its favour.
Generally speaking, the Times upheld the principle of non-intervention and argued that 
Great Britain and Russia were only militarily involved in Persia to protect the lives of 
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both imperial powers, which led the Shah to declare in May 1909 that he would be 
prepared to hold elections. The opposition continued its struggle nonetheless, and the 
Times followed these developments with scepticism. While it supported the constitu-
tional development in Persia, it insisted on the inclusion of the Shah (and Russia) in this 
process and expressed concerns that the demands made by the opposition were too radi-
cal. According to the Times, parliamentary institutions needed time to develop:





show,	 are	 seldom	 judicious.	 […]	 They	 sought	 to	 apply	 in	 practice	 the	 extreme	 conse-
quences	of	 the	democratic	 theories	 they	had	 imbibed	 from	their	Western	 teachers,	and	
they	sought	to	do	this	amongst	populations,	to	whose	ideas	and	traditions	those	theories	
were	altogether	foreign.50
Such a comparison between Persia and Russia, in which the Tsarist Empire appeared as 
merely one step ahead on the path of the Western model, proved to be an exception in 
the commentaries published by the Times during the Persian crisis in 1909. However, 
when a month later Russian parliamentarians visited England, the reforms in Russia 
were the main argument the Times used to promote sympathies for Russia.Prior to the 
meeting between the King of England and the Tsar, the latter was lauded by the Times 
for having introduced a constitution. At the same time, these comments also reveal the 
difference between the images of Russia and Persia as they appeared in the Times. A 
commentary published on 24 June viewed the Russian development as a shift towards 
(re-)Europeanization: 






When it came to Persia on the other hand, the Times deemed the electoral law that was 
announced by the cabinet of the Shah “a daring provision in an Oriental country where 
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Within the context of its coverage of events in Persia, however, the Times tended to por-
tray Russia as the imperial protector of foreign nationals in Persia. As the oppositional 
forces continued their advance and were closing in on Tehran, Russia also redeployed 
troops in proximity of the capital, though it affirmed that this was merely a precaution-
ary measure to protect the lives and property of foreign nationals if necessary. Contrary 
to mistrustful voices in parliament, the Times sided with Foreign Secretary Grey and 
affirmed its confidence in the intentions of the Russians. A commentary from 7 July 
mentioned the “Europeans” on four occasions, claiming they were now being protected 
by Russia just as Great Britain had previously done in the south of Persia.53
As was the case in Great Britain, the German military actions that followed after the 
turn of the century were also less popular there than the two imperial interventions that 
ushered in the beginning of Weltpolitik in 1897. The joint German-British intervention 
in Venezuela (1902/3) was unpopular in both countries, albeit for different reasons. The 
English media were particularly concerned about the reaction of the United States, while 
the co-operation with Germany was met with harsh criticism. When Germany proceed-
ed to bombard Venezuelan forts in January 1903, the English press was indignant at the 
aggressive behaviour of the Germans.54 In Germany on the other hand, criticism mainly 
centred on the lack of success. Nationalist circles in particular criticized Germany’s deci-
sion to yield to American pressure and accept a US-backed solution to the conflict by 
referring it to arbitration.55
Following the outbreak of an uprising in South-West Africa in 1904, colonial wars be-
came a fiercely debated issue in Germany over the next few years.56 Yet another uprising 
had occurred in East Africa that following year, still the debate mainly centred on the war 
in South-West Africa. Initially the government could count on the Reichstag’s approval 
of the military interventions – after all, their primary purpose was to provide protection 
for the Europeans living there. As the wars turned out to be both lengthy and costly, 
however, they became increasingly unpopular over time and came to represent a failure 
of German colonial policy. Moreover, numerous colonial scandals involving abuses of 
authority and violent excesses were exposed at the time and tarnished the reputation of 
German colonial policy even further.57 Beyond this, the genocidal character of warfare 
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sceptic voices alleged that this signified a violation of their own culture.58 Nonetheless, 
the scandals and the rising cost of these military endeavours were of greater importance 
when it came to the dwindling popularity of German colonial policy.
Whenever proponents of German colonial policy called for perseverance, arguments al-
luding to a civilizing mission did not feature prominently. References to the civilizing 
role of Germany would likely have been inopportune, considering that German colonial 
policy regularly faced allegations of officials and settlers on the spot acting contrary to 
all principles of European civilization in the aftermath of the colonial scandals. In the 
Reichstag debate of 30 January 1905, the left-liberal delegate Schrader spoke of “par-
ticular actions of the civilized populations” towards the African population with “did 
not always have a civilizing, but sometimes rather uncivilizing effect.”59 In cases where 
proponents of the war commended the “cultural work” of the settlers, they were not 
referring to their civilization of the native peoples but their work on the land instead. 
Colonial supporters denied the insurgent Herero the capability of contributing to the 
economic development in South-West Africa themselves and thus derived the right of 
the Germans to dispossess the land of the Africans.60
While the Christianization of Africa continued to play a central role for the Centre Party, 
this made it an outsider among the war’s proponents. In light of the increasing conflicts 
between missionaries on one side and the colonial administration and settlers on the 
other, the Christian mission was no longer considered to be the precursor to colonial ex-
pansion – as during the intervention in China in 1897 – but an obstacle instead. When 
the director of the colonial department Stuebel came to address the conflict of interest 
between settlers and missionaries, he made it clear that this mainly concerned “an area 
where Germans can live and attain wealth. This is surely the main purpose of coloniza-
tion.”61 Some newspapers went even further, alleging that the mission in South-West 
Africa had failed, as Africans who had converted to Christianity had also participated in 
the uprising against German rule.62
Proponents of the war thus tended to focus on arguments of an economic nature and 
emphasized the potential for development of the German colonies. In response to criti-
cism from the Social Democratic camp, the conservative delegate Arendt contended 
that “South-West Africa is not a worthless field of sand”.63 Justifications invoking the 
civilizing mission could only appear at the margins in this frame of argumentation, for 
instance when the conservative delegate Liebermann v. Sonneberg described the aim of 















Indeed, in his first speech following his appointment as State Secretary for the Colonies 
on 28 November 1906, Bernhard Dernburg professed his support for the missionaries, 
describing them as one of the “bases from which European culture can advance.”65 Fur-
thermore, he argued that Germany was securing the preservation of European rule over 






The main part of his speech however was devoted to the promise of preventing abuses of 
authority in the future and bringing the colonies onto a more successful course in eco-
nomic terms. Indeed, this particular pledge for reform played no small part in securing 
an electoral success for the pro-colonial parties in the 1907 Reichstag elections.67
3. Concluding Remarks
The aim of this investigation was to determine the functions of representations of Europe 
when it came to the legitimization of colonial wars and imperialist interventions. As it 
has been shown, both proponents and opponents of colonialism came to invoke Europe 
or civilization time and again in the political debates over military actions. For instance, 
in both Great Britain and Germany the argument that military action served to protect 
the lives of Europeans in harm’s way was virtually uncontested. Colonial critics on the 
other hand could repeatedly point out that the conduct of the troops stood in contra-
diction to European values and civilization. Nevertheless, while news reports detailing 
massacres and other misdeeds of the military could be cause for public outrage in the 
short-term, they barely affected the general approval for the military actions. Despite the 
controversies surrounding the methods and conduct of the Commander-in-Chief Lord 
Kitchener, the campaign in the Sudan ranked among the most popular British colonial 






Spreading the European Model by Military Means? The Legitimization of Colonial Wars and Imperialist Interventions in Great Britain and Germany | 5
Africa, the cost of the war and the economic future of the colony were the main points 
of contention, not the means of warfare.
Even when the English press reported on co-operation and conflicts with other imperial-
ist states, representations of the European and the non-European came to be employed. 
During the Boxer War in 1900/01 and the military operation against Tibet in 1903/04, 
English newspapers would occasionally portray Russia as a partly Asian power, while the 
Times described the Tsarist Empire as the protector of Europeans abroad in its commen-
taries on the interventions in the Persian Civil War in 1909. This line of argumentation 
was bolstered by the fact that Russia itself was pursuing a course of political reform that 
followed the West-European example.68
While representations of Europe came to be employed for the aforementioned politi-
cal purposes throughout the period in question, the role of the civilizing mission and 
the exportation of the European model when it came to the legitimization of colonial 
wars and imperialist interventions was subject to change. This was neither the result of 
a changing European self-conception nor a critical re-examination of European civiliza-
tion as a model example, but of altering patterns of perception regarding imperial and 
colonial policy in Great Britain and Germany. Under the banner of an imperial spirit of 
optimism, politicians and the media in Great Britain uniformly legitimized the use of 
military force with the professed aim of spreading civilization up until 1900 (regardless 
of the real political motives and the impact of the policies in the colonies). Once imperial 
military actions and the associated costs in particular became increasingly unpopular in 
the first decade of the twentieth century, arguments invoking the civilizing mission ceased 
to play a significant role. Instead, both politicians and the pro-war press emphasized the 
necessity of these actions and the defensive alignment of British imperial policy.
At a time when voices calling for a more active “Weltpolitik” grew louder in Germany, 
the government not only legitimized the military intervention in China in 1897 and the 
subsequent annexation of the colony Kiao-chau with arguments of an economic nature 
but also with the protection of the Christian mission. However, once military actions in 
the extra-European world came to be discussed more controversially since the autumn 
of 1900 and during the wars in Africa from 1904 to 1907 in particular, the civilizing 
mission no longer played a significant role as a basis for legitimization, just as in Great 
Britain. In contrast to the British case however, supporters of colonial policy in Germany 
were not as defensive in their argumentation and stressed the limited aims of the wars. 
Instead they called for an intensification of the military effort and colonial policy and 
primarily justified this aim with the economic interests of Germany.
In summary, the legitimization of colonial wars and imperialist interventions with argu-
ments in accordance with a civilizing mission tended to be made in cases where the mili-
tary efforts proved successful and the associated policy was popular anyhow. However, 
when wars lasted longer than expected and support dwindled, the exportation of the Eu-
68	 On	the	reforms	in	Russia	cf.	Benjamin	Beuerle’s	article	in	this	volume.
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ropean model hardly played a role in their legitimization anymore. Instead, proponents 
of military action in Great Britain pointed out the strategic or political necessity of these 
interventions, while their German counterparts appealed to the population’s economic 
self-interest.
